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FIGHTNG PIRACY WITH CENSORSHIP
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2010, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the launch of a joint intellectual
property enforcement effort called "Operation in Our Sites" (the Operation).
One of the Operation's key initiatives is blocking access to websites that are
believed to facilitate large-scale infringement of intellectual property rights.
This objective has been pursued through the use of in rem forfeiture actions
against domain names associated with the allegedly infringing websites.
Targeted domain names are typically seized prior to any formal forfeiture
proceedings, under authorization from pretrial seizure warrants obtained by law
enforcement agents.
These pre-trial seizures have garnered scrutiny from scholars, lawmakers,
and advocacy groups who have become concerned about their potentially
adverse impact on constitutionally protected speech. American constitutional
history urges that these concerns not be taken lightly; freedom of expression is
a cornerstone of American liberty. Among the fundamental rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment is the right to remain free from prior restraints of
speech. The Supreme Court has long recognized that prior restraints pose a
grave threat to free speech and has upheld their validity only when they are
accompanied by certain safeguards designed to minimize censorship.
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the Internet's rapid expansion
beyond the reaches of traditional intellectual property laws. Part III continues
with an examination of the Operation's core functions of legal foundations.
Part IV and V explore the history of civil forfeitures and prior restraints in
American jurisprudence. Part VI offers two case studies representative of
seizures carried out under the Operation. Part VII attempts to illuminate the
seizures' ability to encroach upon constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and
urges courts and lawmakers to cure these issues by applying procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to ensure the Operation is carried out in
accordance with the Constitution.
II. BACKGROUND

The emergence of universal Internet access has been heralded as a harbinger
of economic growth, job creation, and a better way of life in the twenty-first
century-akin to the development of electricity a century ago.'
Widely
I

FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN, at xi (2010), http://do

wnload.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf.
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available, high-speed broadband Internet access allows people from around the
world to communicate, organize, and share information and media virtually
instantaneously. 2 This has had an enormous impact on the way creative works
are generated and distributed, and has accelerated creative developments by
affording content producers the ability to share their copyrightable works with a
global audience. 3 This new distributive power4 has benefitted content owners,
creators, Internet users, and the public at large.
Along with ushering in creative and social benefits, however, the meteoric
expansion of the Internet wrought havoc on antiquated intellectual property
5
laws that were ill-suited for the new virtual world. Among the legal issues born
6
copyright infringement.
online
from the expansion was an explosive growth of
Due to the ease and inexpensiveness with which the majority of digital media
products can be distributed over the Internet, online infringement, particularly
that depends on copyrights to
file sharing, has affected virtually every industry
7
production.
sustained
and
profitability
ensure
Litigation between rights holders and online media sharers began practically
8
at the inception of web-based fie-sharing services, and has been ongoing ever
since. 9 The architecture of early sharing services was relatively primitive and fell
0
neatly under the umbrella of then-existing copyright laws.' Shortly after the

2 Id. at 3.
3 Id. at 57-58.
4 Id. at 10.
5 See Michael M. DuBose, Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Propery Laws in the Twenty-First
Century, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 481, 486 (2006) (urging that intellectual property laws be
strengthened and modernized in order to keep pace with emerging technology).
6 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-423, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
OBSERVATION ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEITS AND
PIRATED GOODS 8 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303057.pdf; Tim Wu,
IWben Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 681 (2003).
7 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 6.
8 The first internet file-sharing service, My.MP3.com, came online on January 12, 2000, and
was sued for copyright infringement nine days later on January 21. UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Defendant's Memorandum of Law in
Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Willfuilness, at 3-6, U.M.G.
Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 0472), 2000
WL 34475043, at *6.
9 See, e.g., Wu, supra note 6, at 747-51 (anticipating the legal implications of early file-sharing
designs); see also Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 633-34 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (noting that the defendant was subject to another infringement action eleven years prior to
this file-sharing action).
10 Early file-sharing systems allowed users to access infringing material that was hosted on the
service providers' servers, making for open-and-shut infringement cases. See, e.g., UMG Recordings,

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol21/iss1/6

4

Harrell: Fighting Piracy with Censorship: The Operation in Our Sites Domai
2013]

FIGHTING PIRACY WITH CENSORSHIP

proprietors of these early services were found liable for infringement, however,
new and innovative sharing systems emerged, such as peer-to-peer services,"
which proved to be more evasive.1 2 Courts struggled to apply existing liability
standards to these ever-evolving programs and were forced to create new
3
theories of liability in order to provide affected rights holders with remedies.'
In response to these struggles, Congress provided support to rights holders
and content industries in the form of new legislation intended to thwart the
efforts of online infringers.14 Law enforcement agencies utilized this new
legislation as a springboard to launch a new, sweeping enforcement program set
up to target large-scale online copyright infringement: Operation in Our Sites.' 5
A. OPERATION IN OUR SITES (AND ENABLING LEGISLATION)

In 2010, the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator announced
the launch of Operation in Our Sites, a joint intellectual property enforcement
effort between the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.' 6 The
Operation is aimed at "seizing the domain names of websites providing access
to [allegedly] infringing [online content]."'1 Rather than focusing on specific
infringing content, as is done in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's
(DMCA) notice-and-take-down scheme, 18 the Operation seeks to block access
to entire websites that are believed to be violating, or facilitating the violation
of, copyright law. 19

92 F. Supp. 2d at 350 ("The complex marvels of cyberspatial communication may create difficult
legal issues; but not in this case. Defendant's infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights is clear.").
u1 Pure peer-to-peer networks decentralize online hosting of shared files, allowing users to
share directly with each other rather than through a centralized server; however, most peer-topeer networks opt for a hybrid, partially centralized, design. Wu, supra note 6, at 717-21.
12 See id. at 727-31 (outlining the development of peer-to-peer file-sharing systems designed to
circumvent the liability standards established in early file-sharing cases).
13 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 927-30 (2005)
(establishing a new theory of secondary liability for inducement of copyright infringement).
14 See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
16 2010 IPEC ANN. REP. ON INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 IPEC

ANN. REP.], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec
.reportJfeb2011.pdf.

annual

17 Id

18 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006) (requiring service providers to remove infringing content
upon notice from the copyright holder of the content's infringing nature).
19 See 2010 IPEC ANN. REP., supra note 16 (highlighting the operation's success in redirecting
the targeted websites' visitors to "seizure banners').
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In 2010 and 2011, the DOJ and ICE executed seizure warrants against more
than ninety domain names. 20 Many of the websites associated with these
domain names contained both infringing and non-infringing content. 21 The
Operation's indiscriminate targeting practices and liberal use of pretrial seizures
have led many advocacy groups, scholars, and lawmakers to become concerned
about the potential impact on constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
22
expression.
1. Mechanics of Domain Seizures. The term seizure is somewhat misleading in
this context because a domain cannot be physically seized. Instead, ICE and
the DOJ accomplish the seizures by obtaining a judicial order requiring Internet
service providers to redirect the domain's incoming traffic to a webpage
declaring that the domain has been seized.23 This process is known as "website
redirection." 24 In order to better understand how website redirection works, it
is helpful to be familiar with some basic terminology.
A "website" is a collection of webpages hosted on a web server. 25 Each
website is located by a unique numerical sequence known as an "IP address"
that represents the web server on which it is hosted.2 6 A "domain name" is an
easy to remember set of letters, words, or numbers that is linked to a website's
IP address. 27 When a domain name is entered into the address bar of an

20 Id.at 2; Amid Curiae Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation, Center for Democracy &

Technology, & Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Puerto 80 Projects,
S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11-3390-cv (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Public Knowledge
Amici Curiae Brief], 2011 WL 5909020, at *3.
21 See Feds Return Mistaken# Seized Domain After a Year of Smoke and Mirrors, TORRENTFREAK
(Dec. 8, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/feds-retumrn-seized-domain- 11208/ (discussing the
seizure of dajazl.com and reports suggesting that some of the material on the site was "legally
provided" for distribution).
22 See, e.g., RASHMI RANGNATH, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, COMMENTS OF PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 2-

6 (2012) available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/fles/IPEC%202012-PK%20Comments.
pdf; Eric Goldman, Eric's Blog, 16 No. 8 CYBERSPACE LAW. 18 (discussing the First Amendment
implications of ICE's seizure of Spanish linking site Rojadirecta's domains); Letter from Ron
Wyden, U.S. Senator, to Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., & to John Martin, Dir., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Senator Wyden],
available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=103d77C-6f30-469b-ab98-8bbfdd4fc.
23 Public Knowledge Amid Curiae Brief, supra note 20, at *3-4.
24 See id.
(explaining the process of website redirection).
25 Id.at 4.

26IP Address Definiion, TECHTERMs.COM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/ipaddress
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
27Domain Name Definition, TEcHTERMs.cOM, http://www.techterms.com/defnition/domainname (last visited Sept. 29, 2013). For example, the domain name associated the University of
Georgia School of Law's website is law.uga.edu, while its web server is associated with several IP
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Internet browser, it is converted into the corresponding IP address by a
"domain name system," and the user is then taken to its corresponding
website. 28 A court order authorizing the seizure of a domain name is executed
by replacing the IP address associated with the domain with the IP address of a
web page announcing that the domain has been seized. 29 This effectively
directs any user who enters the seized website's domain name into his Internet
browser to the government-notice webpage, rather than the website he was
attempting to access.
2. Underlying Offenses Giing Rise to Forfeiture ljabiiy. Congress's efforts to
aid in the fight against online piracy led to the passage of two acts aimed at
expanding rights holders' access to remedies for infringement: the Artists'
Rights and Theft Prevention Act of 2005 (ART Act) and the Prioritizing
Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (Pro-IP Act).30 The ART Act, passed on
April 27, 2005, as part of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act, created
a new offense for making a copyrighted work available for download on a
computer network.31 This new offense targeted online file-sharing systems that
32
had managed to avoid liability under existing copyright laws.
On October 13, 2008, Congress passed the Pro-IP Act,33 which sought to
enhance both the civil and criminal remedies available for violations of
intellectual property laws. 34 One of the strategies it employed to accomplish
this was a significant broadening of forfeitures liability in criminal copyright
35
infringement cases.
The Pro-IP Act's forfeiture section supplements Title 18 of the United
States Code with new provisions that allow for the seizure of, inter alia, "[a]ny

addresses: 128.192.1.193, 168.24.81.25, 128.192.1.19. WHOIs, http://www.whois.com/whois/
uga.edu (last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
28 DNS Definition, TECHTERmS.cOM, http://www.techterms.com/definition/dns (last visited
Sept. 29, 2013).
29 Ann Chaitovitz et al., Responding to Onine Piracy: Mapping the Legal and Pokhj Boundaries, 20
COMmLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 7 (2011).
30 Maria A. Pallante, The Next GreatCopyrightAct, 36 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 315, 319-20 (2013).
31 Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, § 102, 119 Star. 218,
220 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. S 2319B (2006)).
32 See, e.g.,Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218-19 (D. Minn. 2008)
(finding that making songs available for download was not considered distribution under the
Copyright Act).
33 Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-403, 122 Stat. 4256 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C., and 18
U.S.C.).
34 Id. §§ 101-105, 201-209 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 17 U.S.C.,
and 18 U.S.C.).
35 Id. § 206 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2012)).
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property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part to conunit or
facilitate the commission" of criminal copyright infringement. 36 These new
provisions, specifically 18 U.S.C. 5 2323(a)(1)(A)-(B), are the primary statutory
tools used by the DOJ and ICE to seize domain names under the Operation. 37
The broader forfeiture power granted by the Pro-IP Act has proved
controversial: proponents of the increased power argue that it is necessary in
order to allow law enforcement to effectively combat piracy, 38 while opponents

believe its wide breadth risks exposing property to forfeiture that "may have
only a fleeting connection to the [underlying intellectual property] offense." 39
Additionally, the new power has been opposed on the ground that it serves to
"remove the important safeguard of judicial discretion" in forfeiture cases
involving copyright offenses. 40
4. The Pro-IP and Art Acts. Section 2323(a)(1)(A) stipulates that any
property, the creation or distribution of which is prohibited under the criminal
copyright statue, 17 U.S.C. § 506, is subject to forfeiture to the government. 41
Subsection (a)(1)(B) of § 2323 further makes subject to forfeiture any property
used, or intended to be used, to facilitate an offense prohibited by 17 U.S.C.
§ 506.42 Therefore, in order to show that property referred to in subsection
(a)(1)(B) is subject to forfeiture, the government must first show that there is an
underlying violation of § 506 giving rise to such liability. 43
5. The Operation. The civil forfeiture provisions of Chapter 46 of the United
States Code govern the procedure for forfeitures and seizures of property
connected with intellectual property crimes. 44 Relevant provisions require the
36

Id

37 See Verified Amended Complaint

28, 21, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11 Civ. 4139
(PAC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012) (seeking forfeiture of allegedly infringing domain names "pursuant

to" 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(A)-(B)).
38 See, e.g., 154 Cong. Rec. S7280-81 (daily ed. July 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).

39 Pnoriti#ng Resources and Organizationfor Intellectual Property Act of 2007: Heating on H.R. 4279
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualPropery of the H. Comm. on the Judidagy, 11 Oth
Cong. 72 (2007) (prepared statement of Gigi B. Sohn, President and Co-Founder, Public
Knowledge).
40 Id at 72-73 ("Under current law, a court has the &lscielionto order the forfeiture of devices
merely intended to be used in copyright infringement.... The [new] criminal provisions require
forfeiture of not only the infringing goods, but 'any property... intended to be used... [in] the
commission of an offense.'" (second emphasis in original)).
41 18 U.S.C. § 2323(a)(1)(A) (West, WesdawNext through P.O. 113-31 (Aug. 9, 2013)).

Id.§ 2323(a)(1)(B).
Subsections (A) and (B) also apply to trafficking counterfeit goods and recording motion
pictures. Id.
§ 2323(a)(1)(A)-(B). However, these offenses are beyond the scope of this Note.
44 Id § 2323(a)(2). The relevant provisions here are 18 U.S.C. § 981 and 983. See id §§ 981,
983 (setting out the general rules for civil forfeiture proceedings).
42
43
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government to either provide parties with an interest in the property written
notice of the seizure as soon as is reasonably possible after the date of a seizure,
or initiate a forfeiture action against the property no more than sixty days after
the seizure. 45 If no notice is provided or action filed within sixty days of the
46
seizure, the government is required to return the seized property to its owner.
This deadline can be extended for an additional sixty days if the government
can show there is reason to believe provision of notice may have an adverse
47
effect on the proceedings.
Once notice has been provided, persons with interest in the property may
file a claim for its return before a deadline specified in the notice, with said
48
If an
deadline being at least thirty-five days from the notice's mailing date.
days
ninety
has
government
the
property,
of
the
return
requests
party
interested
49
petitioning
A
claimant
action.
forfeiture
a
judicial
to either comply or initiate
for release of seized property is required to show that continued dispossession
of the property "will cause substantial hardship" and that such hardship
"outweighs the risk that the property will be [somehow compromised]" if
returned to the claimant pending resolution of the proceeding.5 0
B. FORFEITURE AS A REMEDY

The forfeiture of property is a centuries-old remedy that has been applied to
51
increasingly diverse areas of American criminal law over the past 150 years.
"Forfeiture" is defined as a government taking of property that has been
acquired or used illegally, without compensation to its owner.5 2 In 1790, the
First Congress of the United States introduced the country's earliest civil

41 Id. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).

46 Id.§ 983(a)(1)(F).

47 Id. § 983(a)(1)(C)-(D). Such adverse effects include "endangering the... safety of an
individual," "flight from prosecution," "destruction of or tampering with evidence," "intimidation
of potential witnesses," and "otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying
a trial." Id. § 983(a)(l)(D)(i)-(v).
48 Id. § 983(a)(2)(A)-(B). However, if no notice is received a claim may be filed within "30
days after the date of final publication of notice of seizure." Id. § 983(a)(2)(B).
49 Id. § 983(a)(3)(A).
Examples of substantial hardship provided in the statute include
50 Id. 983(f(1)(A)-(D).
"preventing the functioning of a business, preventing an individual from working, or leaving an
individual homeless." Id. § 983(0(1)(C).
51 DEE R. EDGEWORTH, AssET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS 23-24 (2d ed. 2008).
52 GREGORY M. VECCHI & ROBERT T. SIGLER, AssETS FORFEITURE: A STUDY OF THE POLICY
AND IT'S PRACTICE 41 (2001).
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forfeiture statutes for use against ships and cargoes involved in customs
53

violations.

Modern federal forfeiture statutes provide for both criminal and civil
forfeiture.5 4 Criminal forfeitures are actions in personam filed as part of a
criminal case,5 5 while civil forfeitures are actions in rem, filed against property
allegedly used in connection with a crime.5 6 Consequently, criminal forfeitures
require a conviction of the related offenses before the property at issue can be
seized, 57 while their civil counterparts do not.58 This allows law enforcement
agencies to obtain immediate possession of the-property pending resolution of a
civil forfeiture action.5 9 Also, because they are civil actions, lower burdens of
proof, such as probable cause, are adequate to establish the forfeiture. 60 The
government, therefore, is required to demonstrate only that there is probable
cause to believe the property is in some way connected with an underlying
61
criminal offense.

1. Civil Forfeiture in the Context of Copynght Offenses. Following Congress's
enactment of early maritime and admiralty forfeiture laws, an increasingly wide
variety of property has been made subject to forfeiture under federal statutes.62
Early applications of the remedy in America were largely motivated by practical
and economic concerns: arresting the captains of smuggling vessels was
ineffective at preventing future smuggling if the ship's owner retained
possession of the vessel, and seizing goods that were in violation of customs
law provided an additional source of income for the newly established federal
53 EDGEWORTH,

supra note 51, at 23.

Id at 23--24. An in personam action is brought against a person. In an in rem action, the
named defendant is a piece of property, the action being brought to determine the tide to said
property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 32 (9th ed. 2009).
55 Id at 5.
56 VECCHI & SIGLER, supra note 52, at 43.
57 EDGEWORTH, supra note 51, at 5.
58 Id. at 8.
59 See id. (citing Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 84 (1992) (holding that
following seizure the government legally retains possession of forfeited property until final
disposition of the seizure action)).
54

60

Id

See Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399-401 (1877) (upholding the seizure
of property whose owner was unaware it was being used to commit a crime and clarifying that
offenses defined in civil forfeiture statutes are attached primarily to the property itself, without
any regard for the owner's misconduct or, in this case, lack thereo.
62 See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(c) (2006) (subjecting to forfeiture any assets used in or obtained
from criminal racketeering activities); J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S.
505 (1921) (confirming the constitutionality of a statute providing for forfeiture of property used
in connection with tax fraud); Dobbins's Distilrj, 96 U.S. at 404 (affirming a judicial seizure of
property used in connection with an illegal distilling operation).
61
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government. 63 Forfeiture was first utilized as a crime-fighting tool in 1970
when Congress added forfeiture provisions to the federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statutes in an attempt to disgorge
With the enactment of the
criminals of illegally acquired assets.64
Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Congress augmented the
RICO statutes' forfeiture provisions to include property used in intellectual
65
property violations.
2. Seizure of Properly for Civil Forfeitures. Civil forfeitures are necessarily
initiated by a valid seizure of property named as the defendant in an in rem
proceeding.66 As previously noted, the civil forfeiture provisions of Chapter 46
of the United States Code govern the procedure for § 2323 forfeitures. Section
981 of Chapter 46 provides that the government can seize property only after it
has obtained a seizure warrant in compliance with the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. 67 Consequently, the government must submit sworn testimony or
an affidavit to a judge, establishing probable cause that the property in question
is forfeitable. 68 After the warrant is obtained, the government is authorized,
without
under the specific circumstances, to seize the property immediately,
69
providing the owner notice or opportunity to be heard in court.
3. Concerns Surrounding Civil Forfeitures. Civil forfeitures have long been a
source of concern for advocates of constitutional rights. One of the principle
criticisms is that pretrial seizures without provision of notice and opportunity to
be heard violate due process. 70 In. Fuentes v. Shevin, the Supreme Court
established that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 7' due process requires that

63 HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVE 10 (2002).

64 Grace Pyun, The 2008 Pro-IPAct: The Inadequay of the Propery Paradigmin CriminalIntelkctual
Property Law and Its Effect on ProsecutorialBoundaries, 19 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L.
355, 383 (2009).
65 See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 5 3, 110 Stat.
1386 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994)).
66 See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984) ("[Ain action
to enforce a forfeiture 'shall be in the nature of a proceeding in reminn... the district where such
seizure is made.'" (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 7323)). In rem jurisdiction over the property is
established when the property is seized. Id.
67 18 U.S.C. §981(b)(2) (2006).
68 FED. R. CRiM. P. 41 (d)(1)-(2).

69 Carlero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 678-79 (1974).
70 See Douglas Kim, Asset Fofeiture: Giving Up Your ConstitutionalRights, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV.
527, 565 (1997) (contending that the Supreme Court has sacrificed constitutional due process by
eschewing the notice requirement in seizure actions).
71 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1983) ("[T]he Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect
internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect against
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property owners be provided with notice and opportunity to be heard prior to
any seizure of their property.7 2 Despite the Fuentes Court's deference to the
constitutional rights of property owners, subsequent cases have held that the
government's need to exercise in rem jurisdiction over forfeitable property
constitutes an extraordinary circumstance in and of itself, essentially eliminating
the need for seizures to comport with traditional notions of due process. 7 3
Another related and often-raised concern is the speed with which an
interested party has an opportunity to be heard in court after the seizure.7 4 In
situations where a forfeiture proceeding is initiated by seizing property without
provision of notice or an adversarial hearing, due process requires that a
claimant be given a post-seizure hearing within a reasonable amount of time.75
However, this requirement is neglected in cases where law enforcement
agencies seize property but delay bringing a forfeiture proceeding, denying the
claimant an opportunity to be heard in the interim. 76 The Court balances four
factors in determining whether the period of time between the seizure and the
initiation of the related forfeiture action violated due process: (1) the length of
the delay, (2) the government's reasons for the delay, (3) the claimant's assertion
of a right to a hearing, and (4) whether the claimant has been prejudiced by the
77
delay.
C. PRIOR RESTRAINTS

1. HistoricalBackground. A "prior restraint" is a judicial order that "forbid[s]
expression before it takes place." 78 Prior restraints are distinguished from
subsequent punishments as the latter punishes wrongdoers for expression that
has already been made rather than prohibiting expression from ever taking
the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and

contaminated food.").

Id at 82 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)).
73 See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1989); United States v. Eight
Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 562 n.12
(1983); Cakro-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 678-79. Interestingly, the Court has held that due process
requires notice and opportunity to be heard in court before any realproperty can be seized. See,
e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993).
74 EDGEWORTH, supra note 51, at 210-11.
75 Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70.
76 See Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that the government's failure
to bring a forfeiture proceeding, thereby denying the defendant an opportunity to be heard in
court for more than two months after his vehicle was seized, violated due process).
77 $8,850 in U.S. Currng,461 U.S. at 564 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
78 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NImMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:1, at 15-4 (West
72

3d ed. 2011).
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place. 79 Historically, the Supreme Court has considered prior restraint a much
more egregious intrusion on constitutionally protected expression than
subsequent punishment. 80 Consequently, courts scrutinize prior restraints
81
under a strong presumption of invalidity.
The rationale underlying this judicial hostility toward treatment of prior
restraints is rooted in the fundamental aversion to censorship the First
Amendment embodies. 82 In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, the Court
elucidated some of the societal and legal considerations that drive the prior
restraint doctrine:
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of
speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all others
beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance what an
individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate

speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling
8
censorship are formidable.

3

In light of these considerations, the Supreme Court has characterized prior
restraints as "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
85
Amendment rights"' 4 and has relegated their use to exceptional situations.
2. Near v. Minnesota. The seminal prior restraint case in American
jurisprudence is Near v. Minnesota.86 In Near, the Supreme Court assessed the
constitutional validity of a Minnesota statute that "provide[d] for the
abatement... of a 'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine

79 Id.

80 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) ("[L]iberty of the press, historically
considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.").
81 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1965) (applying the presumption against
prior restraints in the context of motion pictures and holding "that a noncriminal process which
requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes a
place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system");
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.").
82 2 SMoLLA, supra note 78, § 15:2.
83 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)).
84 Near,283 U.S. at 716 ("[The protection even as to [prior] restraint is not absolutely limited.
But the limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases.').
85 Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
86 283 U.S. 697.
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or other periodical.'

"87 A Minneapolis-area county attorney brought an action
under the statute to enjoin a local newspaper from future publication. 88
The action alleged that the newspaper had, on nine occasions, circulated
publications that "were 'largely devoted to malicious, scandalous and
defamatory articles.' "89 At issue were publications asserting that Minneapolis
"law enforcement officers and agencies were not energetically performing their
duties," as evidenced by their refusal to prosecute a local gangster who was
engaged in illicit activities throughout the city.90 A district court judge
permanently enjoined the newspaper from producing or circulating any further
publications in violation of the Minnesota statute. 91 The owner of the
newspaper appealed the injunction to the Minnesota Supreme Court, arguing
the statute violated his right to freedom of expression under the U.S.
Constitution. 92 The court affirmed the order and upheld the constitutional
93
validity of the statute.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Minnesota high
court's ruling, declaring the statute to be an infringement of the liberty of the
press as guaranteed by the Constitution. 94 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
further remarked that the district court's finding that the newspaper was largey
devoted to the publication of material prohibited by the statute did not justify
the encroachment of the constitutional protection from prior restraint. 95
3. DistinguishingPriorRestraintfrom Subsequent Punishment. At first glance, the
distinction between the prior restraint of, and subsequent punishment for,
expression may seem relatively clear. Upon closer examination, however, the
line between the two becomes murkier. This is because typical prior restraints,
such as court orders or statutes banning future speech, do not physically
restrain an individual from speaking, but rather subject him to criminal
sanctions for doing so. 96 It is only in extraordinary circumstances, such as the

87 Id at 701-02.
88 Id.at 703.
89 Id.

90Id.
at 704.

91 Id at 705-06.
92 Id at 706.
93 Id.at 706-07.
9 See id.
at 713, 722-23 ("[ft is the chief purpose of the guaranty [of freedom of the press] to
prevent previous restraints upon publication.").
95 Id.at 722-23; see also id.
at 720 ("If the publisher has a right, without previous restraint, to
publish [the prohibited materials], his right cannot be deemed to be dependent upon his
publishing something else, more or less, with the matter to which the objection is made.").
96 2 SMOLLA, supra note 78, § 15.2.
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seizure of a printing press or radio station, that the prior restraint functions to

97
literally restrain future expression.
Although the distinction between the two might seem unimportant when
examined in the abstract, its significance becomes apparent when evaluated in
practical terms. The Supreme Court highlighted the important procedural
differences between prior restraints and subsequent punishments in Akxander v.
United States.98 In Alexander, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of a
court-ordered forfeiture of the defendant's adult entertainment business in the
face of a First Amendment challenge. 99 The defendant was convicted of
numerous obscenity violations and three federal RICO violations, predicated on
the obscenity charges.'0o The forfeiture order authorized the government to
seize all property "represent[ing] [defendant's] interest in the racketeering
enterprise" and all "assets and proceeds [he] had obtained from his racketeering
offenses." 101
The defendant argued that the seizures, which effectively shut down his
adult entertainment business, did not constitute a permissible criminal
punishment, but rather operated as an unconstitutional prior restraint on
expression. 10 2 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, reiterating that "the
distinction between prior restraints and subsequent punishments... is critical
to... First Amendment jurisprudence.' ' 0 3 First, the Court examined the
substantive nature of the RICO statute, finding it to be fundamentally different
from statutory schemes deemed prior restraints. 10 4 The common vein running
through its previous invalidations was a governmental seizure of presumptively
protected material suspected of being obscene prior to any judicial
determination as to its obscenity.105 The order at issue, however, called for the
forfeiture of defendant's assets not because they were obscene, but rather
06
because they were directly related to the defendant's racketeering violations.
The procedural aspects of the forfeiture were also distinct from those
statutory schemes constituting prior restraints. The Court opined that, unlike in

97 Id.

98 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
99 Id.at 559. The Court did remand the case to consider whether the forfeiture was "an
'excessive' penalty within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause," but
that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. Id.
100Id. at 547.
101Id. at 548.
102 Id. at 548-49.
103 Id. at 554-55.
104 Id.at 550-51.
105 Id.at 551.
106 Id.(explanatory)
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many of its other prior restraint rulings, the seizure here was not premature. 07
Key to this determination was the fact was that the forfeiture had been made
after a full criminal trial on the obscenity and RICO charges underlying the
forfeiture. 08 The Court therefore determined that the substantive and
procedural aspects of the RICO law's statutory scheme lacked the essential
qualities of a prior restraint. 109
4. Probable Cause as a Basisfor Seing ProtectedMaterials. Fifty-eight years after
deciding Near,the Supreme Court issued another landmark prior restraint ruling
in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana. 10 The Court was once again confronted with
the constitutionality of RICO-related forfeiture when a state court ordered the
immediate seizure of an adult bookstore and all of its contents."' The state of
Indiana filed a civil action seeking the seizure, alleging that the bookstore's
owner had violated the Indiana state RICO statute via his repeated sales of
books and films, the distribution of which was proscribed by state obscenity
laws." 2 As authorized by the Indiana Civil Remedies for Racketeering Activity
statute, the court issued the order ex parte based on a showing that there was
probable cause to believe that the property in question was involved with a
13
RICO violation."
The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari to consider
the constitutional issues raised by the seizure." 4 The Court found the seizure to
be unconstitutional, stating that mere probable cause to believe materials are
subject to seizure is insufficient to remove presumptively protected materials
from circulation." 5 Additionally, the Court noted that the way in which a prior
restraint of speech was characterized, in this case as a motion under the Indiana
state RICO violation, is of little consequence when determining its
constitutional validity." 6 The Court finally held that only a determination after
an adversarial hearing on the merits of the offenses underlying the seizure
"properly establishes ... the claimed justifications for [the] seiz[ure]."" 7
5. Constitutionaly RequiredSafeguards. While the Supreme Court has declined
to hold that prior restraints are per se unconstitutional, it has enumerated
107Id

at 552 (explanatory).

108 Id
109Id.at 554-55.

no 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
111 Id.
112 Id. at
113 Id at
114 Id.at
115 Id at

50-51.
51.
53.
65-66.

116 Id at 66.
117 Id.at 67.
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certain safeguards that must be in place in order to overcome the strong
presumption against their validity. The Court articulated these safeguards in a
1965 case involving a Maryland statute requiring films to be submitted to a state
board of censors before being shown in public." 8 In Freedman v. Mayland, the
Court deemed the statute an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech." 9 The
decision was based primarily on a finding that the statute lacked requisite
procedural safeguards. 120 Specifically, the Court identified three criteria that
must be satisfied by the procedural scheme of a prior restraint in order to
"ensure[] the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression."' 2'
First, the burden of proving that the restrained expression is constitutionally
unprotected must be placed on the censor. 22 The Maryland statutory scheme
lacked this safeguard: once the censorship board withheld approval of a film,
the would-be exhibitor assumed the burden of initiating a judicial proceeding
and convincing a court that the film was constitutionally protected
123
expression.
Second, an adversarial proceeding is necessary to determine whether or not
the speech at issue is constitutionally protected. 24 This safeguard was also
absent from the Maryland statute because an exhibitor could be convicted of a
statutory violation for showing the film after unsuccessfully applying for a
license to do so, but prior to any judicial proceeding regarding the film's
constitutional status.125 This would effectively lend finality to the censor's
126
decision without a court having ever ruled on the film's obscenity.
Third, the implementing procedure must assure a prompt, final judicial
decision. 127 This serves to minimize the potential impact of a preliminary
determination and prevent erroneous restriction of protected speech. 28 The
Court explained this safeguard was especially important in light of the fact that
a temporary restraint, even after its expiration, might discourage exhibitors

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
119Id. at 60.
120 Id. at 58.
118

121

Id.

122 Id.

("Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly
requires ... that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants engaged in
criminal speech." (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
123 Id. at 60.
124
125
126
127
128

Id.
Id.
Id.at 58-60.
Id.at 59.
Id.at 58-59.
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from ever showing the film. 129 The Court's examination of the Maryland
procedural scheme revealed that it did not provide any assurance of a prompt
judicial proceeding.130
In sum, the aversion to prior restraints in American jurisprudence was firmly
established by the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota.131 The doctrine has since
been refined in cases wrestling with the issue of what does and does not
constitute a prior restraint of speech. Once a court has determined that a prior
restraint exists, the Supreme Court mandates that certain procedures be
132
followed to ensure that there is minimal impact on free speech.
D. CASE STUDIES: SEIZURES DURING (USING) OPERATION IN OUR SITES AND
RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS

The government has lauded Operation in Our Sites as a successful effort
in the fight against large-scale online copyright infringement. 133 This praise is
not without merit; the Operation has resulted in the seizure of numerous
domain names linked to websites offering access to illegal content. 34 These
successes, however, have come at a price as the government's blunt tactics have
resulted in seizures of domains that are not in violation of intellectual property
laws or that have little or no connection to the violations targeted for
prevention. 135 An evaluation of two of the Operation's seizures illustrates the
impact its procedures can have on constitutionally protected speech on the
Internet.
1. DajarZ4.com. In November 2010, ICE executed seizure warrants against
the domain names of eighty-two websites that were allegedly involved in the
illegal sale and distribution of copyrighted materials. 36 Among these was the
129 Id. at 59.
130 Id. at 60.

131283 U.S. at 722-23.
132 See Freedman, 380 U.S. 51 (discussing the required constitutional safeguards of a valid prior
restraint).
133 See ICE Seizes 82 Website Domains Involved in Selling Counte eit Goods as Part of Cyber Monday
Crackdown, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter ICE
Seizes 82 Domains], http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1011/101129washington.htm (crediting
the Operation with "disrupt[ing] the sale of counterfeit goods, while also cutting off funds to
[intellectual property criminals]" (quoting Att'y Gen. Eric Holder) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
134 See News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, List of Domain Names
Seized by ICE (Nov. 29, 2010) [hereinafter ICE News Release], http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
news/releases/2010/domain-names.pdf.
135 See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
136 See ICE Seizes 82 Domains,supra note 133.
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domain name for a well-known hip-hop website, dajazl.com. 13 Dajazl.com
(dajazl) is a blog that functions mainly to, among other things, host links that
allow its users to locate and download the latest hip-hop music. 138 The website
is often used as a sounding board for artists to submit previously unreleased
content in an effort to generate support for their forthcoming material1 39
An affidavit submitted by the government in support of the seizure warrant
alleged that dajazl was "actively facilitating the distribution of pirated
content."'14 These allegations were based on an investigation carried out by an
ICE agent who testified that he was able to gain access to "download links" to
three copyrighted songs through the dajazl website.' 4' After evaluating public
copyright records and speaking with representatives from the Recording
Industry Association of America, the agent concluded that the songs were
posted on the dajazl website without the permission of their respective rights
142
holders.
The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California found probable
cause to believe dajazl was subject to seizure and granted a seizure warrant for
the dajazl.com domain name. 143 After the warrant was issued, dajazl's owner
disputed the allegations, claiming that the copyright holders' representatives
personally sent him the allegedly infringing songs. 144 After more than a year of
delays, the government failed to initiate a formal forfeiture proceeding and the
domain name was returned to dajazl's owner. 145
2. Rojadirecta.com. Another of the Operation's seizures carried on shaky
legal footing was that of the rojadirecta.com and rojadir-e-c-t-a.org domain
names (Rojadirecta domains). These domains are associated with a Spanishbased website called Rojadirecta (Rojadirecta website) that indexes streaming
links for sporting events from around the Internet and provides forums for
users to discuss the events. 146 ICE seized the Rojadirecta domain names on

137 ICE News Release, supra note 134, at 1.

138See DAJAZI.COM, http://dajazl.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
139Terms of Service, DAJAZ.COM, http://dajazl.com/terms-of-service (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
140Application & Affidavit for Seizure Warrant at 15, In rethe Seizure of 5 Domain Names,
No. 10-2822M (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/Appliand
AffforSeizureWarrant- 1.pdf.
141 Id.at 56.
142 Id.

143 Seizure Warrant, In rethe Seizure of 5 Domain Names, No. 10-2822M (C.D. Cal. Nov. 30,
2010), availableat http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/SeizureWarrant%282/29.pdf.
144Ben Sisario, Music Web Sites Dispute Legalit of Their Closing N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 19, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/business/media/20music.html.
145Copyright Poligy, DAJAZl.COM, http://dajazl.com/copyright-policy/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
146 ROJADIRECTA.COM, http://www.rojadirecta.me/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013).
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February 1, 2011, after the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
147
York issued a prejudgment order authorizing the seizure.
On June 13, 2011, over four months after the seizure was executed, Puerto
80 Projects (Puerto 80), the owner of the Rojadirecta domains and website,
petitioned the court for the release of its domain names. 48 Puerto 80 argued,
inter aia, that the government's seizure suppressed constitutionally protected
expression in the forums section of the Rojadirecta website and would cause a
"vast majority" of its users to stop visiting the website.' 49 It contended that
these circumstances constituted a "substantial hardship" under 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(f)(1)(C), and therefore warranted immediate release of the Rojadirecta
domains pending resolution of the forfeiture proceeding 5 0 The district court,
15
The
however, was not persuaded by either argument and denied the petition.
court opined that Puerto 80's First Amendment argument lacked merit because
the Rojadirecta website's "main purpose" was cataloging links to copyrighted
events, rather than facilitating discussion in its forums. 5 2 The court was also of
the opinion that because the Rojadirecta websites had been moved to other
domain names since the forfeiture through which they could still be accessed,
the reduction in traffic caused by the seizure did not constitute a substantial
53
hardship.
Four days later, on June 17, 2011, the government brought an action in the
15 4
Southern District of New York seeking forfeiture of the Rojadirecta domains.
The complaint alleged the domains were forfeitable property under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2323(a)(1)(A)-(B) "because there [was] probable cause to believe they [were]
used, or intended to be used, to commit or facilitate the commission of criminal
[copyright] infringement."' 55 The allegations were based on an investigation
carried out by ICE agents in which they accessed the Rojadirecta website

147Verified Amended Complaint, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11 Civ. 4139 (PAC),
2012 WL 2869487 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Rojadirecta Amended Complaint].
148 Order, Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U. v. United States, No. 11 Civ. 3983 (PAC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
4, 2011) [hereinafter Rojadirecta Order], available at http://www.eft.org/files/filenode/Puerto80
Lv.yUS/RojadirectaOrder.pdf.
149 Id.at3-4.

150 Id. at 3; see generally supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing a claimant's
entitlement under § 983 to an immediate release of seized property on a showing of substantial
hardship).
151 Rojadirecta Order, supra note 148, at 3-5.
152 Id.at 4 (emphasis added).
153 Id.

154Verified Complaint, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11 CIV 4139, 2011 WL 2428753
(S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2011).
155 Rojadirecta Amended Complaint, supra note 147, 28, at 21.
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through the Rojadirecta domains and were led to streaming links for various
15 6
copyrighted sporting events.
Shortly after the government initiated its forfeiture action against the
Rojadirecta domains, Puerto 80 moved to dismiss the complaint, 5 7 arguing that
the government failed to allege facts that, if proven, would suffice to show that
its operation of the Rojadirecta website constituted criminal copyright
infringement under § 506.158
First, it argued that the website had not
committed direct copyright infringement because, as noted earlier, it did not
host links to infringing content, but only indexed links that were available
elsewhere on the Internet. 5 9 Furthermore, while conceding that civil liability
can be established for indirect or contributory infringement, it argued that there
existed no criminal offense of contributory infringement. 160
Additionally, Puerto 80 argued that the government did not allege facts
supporting an inference of willfulness regarding any infringement that might
have occurred.' 6' To demonstrate willfulness in the context of criminal
copyright infringement, so the argument went, the government must show facts
pointing to "something more ...than the doing of the act proscribed by the
statute."' 62 On August 29, 2012, more than eighteen months after the date of
the seizure, the government dropped the case, and the Southern District of
New York ordered that the Rojadirecta domains be returned to Puerto 80.163

3.

Concerns Surrounding Operation in Our Sites Seizures.

The dajazl and

Rojadirecta seizures have received criticism from many who believe that the
Operation's tactics are legally questionable and potentially ineffective at fighting
piracy. 164 Lawmakers have expressed concern that, given the ongoing legal
debate in America over whether websites should be liable for their users'
infringements, the Operation could be used by law enforcement agencies as a

156 Id. 18-21, at 13-19, 23, at 20.
157 Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Claimant's Motion to Dismiss, United
States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11-cv-4139 (AAC) (FM), 2011 WL 8200848 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2011).
158 Id.at 6.
159 Id.at 6-8.
160 Id.at 8-10.

161Id.at 12-14.
162 Id.at 13 (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
163 Order, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11 Civ. 4139 (PAC) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.wired.com/irnagesblogs/threatlevel/2012/08/Endorsed-Order-Vacati
ng-Seizure-Warrants.pdf; Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11
Civ. 4139 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2012), ECF No. 55.
164 See infra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
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means of end-running proper legal procedures and effectively disabling websites
that may otherwise prevail in formal proceedings. 65 Additionally, some critics
of the Operation have expressed doubts as to its effectiveness at combating
piracy, given that the websites associated with the seized domains can still be
166
accessed through their IP addresses or through alternative domain names.
In addition to skepticism about the underlying motivations and effectiveness
of the Operation, many have taken issue with the potential for seizures to
encroach on constitutional rights. 167 Specifically, rights advocates have argued
that the seizures curtail free speech and deprive domain holders of due
process.

168

III. ANALYSIS

If ICE and the DOJ plan to continue with Operation in Our Sites, the pretrial seizures of domain names must be carried out with much more sensitivity
to constitutional freedoms. The First Amendment grants individuals both the
right to distribute and receive information169-rights the Supreme Court has
specifically held applicable to Internet communications. 170 The Operation
attempts to accomplish its goals by blocking users' access to targeted websites
and the information hosted on them, while virtually ignoring the obvious
constitutional implications of doing so. Pretrial seizures of domain names
constitute prior restraints of speech, and are therefore only constitutionally
permissible if accompanied by the procedural safeguards identified by the
Supreme Court. These safeguards have been conspicuously absent from the
Operation's seizures. Additionally, due process mandates that domain name
owners be provided notice and an opportunity to be heard before their property
can legally be taken. 17' Although the Supreme Court has not required the
government to provide property owners with prior notice in most civil

165 Letter from Senator Wyden, supra note 22.

16 Chaitovitz, supra note 29, at 37.

167 See, e.g., id. at 9-11 (discussing due process and First Amendment concerns raised by critics
of the Operation).
168 See, e.g.,RANGNATH, supra note 22, at 3-7; Letter from Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Congressman to
John Morton, Dir., U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.wy

den.senate.gov/download/representative-lofgren-letter-to-ice-expressing-concern-about-internet-

domain-name-seizures-conducted-under-operation-in-our-sites.
169 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
170 See, e.g.,
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866-70 (1997) (analogizing the regulation of speech
over the Internet to other mediums of expression).
171

Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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forfeiture cases, 172 the First Amendment concerns at issue here warrant a
different result. Finally, the suppression of free speech constitutes a substantial
hardship within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 983, and therefore warrants the
immediate release of seized domains upon petition by an interested party.
A. SEIZURES CARRIED OUT UNDER OPERATION IN OUR SITES CONSTITUTE
PRIOR RESTRAINTS OF FREE SPEECH

The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech is one of the foundations
of the American democratic system. The Supreme Court has long recognized
that implicit in this guarantee is the right of individuals to be able to express
themselves free from prior restraint. 173 The Court has defined prior restraints
as "judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of
the time that such communications are to occur."'1 74 The seizure of the
Rojadirecta domains, like many of the Operation's seizures, was carried out
specifically to prevent Internet users from communicating through the website
and accessing the information hosted there. The cases in which the Supreme
Court has wrestled with the determination of what does and does not constitute
a prior restraint have typically involved criminal penalties for certain prohibited
future expression. 175 In the case of Operation in Our Sites however, there is no
threat of criminal penalty for speaking. Rather, the government has gone a step
further by blocking access to the very instruments used for communication
without any engagement in a adversarial proceeding.
The government has attempted to argue that the seizures do not function as
prior restraints because they are not based on any determination regarding the
expressive content on the website, but rather are founded on the illegal content
176
that can be found there, which is not protected by the First Amendment.
177
They argue the situation is analogous to that of the Arcara case, in which the
Supreme Court upheld a court order closing down an adult bookstore for
violating a local nuisance statute. 178 The Arcara Court reasoned that the closure
172 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
173 See supranotes 78-85 and accompanying text.
174 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 542, 549-50 (1993) (quoting MELVIN B. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03, at 4-14 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
175 See supra Part II.C.
176 Government's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Claimant Puerto 80 Projects, S.L.U.'s

Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 18-20, United States v. Rojadirecta.org, No. 11
Civ. 4139 (PAC) (FM), 2011 WL 2869501 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Government's
Memorandum].
177 Id. at 18-19.

178 Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
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order was not a prior restraint because its imposition was unrelated to any
expressive content. 79 Instead, the prior restraint was based on evidence that
illicit sexual activities, prohibited by the statute, were occurring on the
property. 80 Arcara, however, is not a proper analog for domain seizure cases.
Unlike in Arcara, the government has not alleged any cognizable theories of
liability against owners of seized domain names. Put simply, the government
cannot sidestep the free speech issue by relying on the proposition that
copyright infringement is not protected by the First Amendment if it has done
nothing to show that the website is in fact liable for infringement.
The government also contends that because the websites associated with
seized domain names can still be accessed using alternate domains or the
website's IP address, no expression has been prohibited, and therefore the
seizures cannot constitute prior restraints. 181 Here again the government
erroneously relies on Arcara to support its position. In Arara, the Court
reasoned that because the First Amendment concerns at issue were "dubious at
best," and the defendant remained free to sell books at another location, the
closure order imposed no restraint on the dissemination of particular
materials.' 82 But the free speech concerns at issue here are much more than
dubious; the Rojadirecta website has "hundreds of thousands of registered
users" from around the world, 183 a large majority of which were deterred from
84
accessing the website while the domains were seized
B. THE OPERATION'S SEIZURE PROCEDURES FAIL TO INCORPORATE THE
FREEDMAN SAFEGUARDS, RENDERING THE SEIZURES CONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPERMISSIBLE

The seizure procedure utilized in Operation in Our Sites must comply with
constitutional boundaries by implementing the safeguards laid out by the
Supreme Court in Freedman v. Mayland 85 The seizures thus far have failed to
implement these safeguards and are therefore constitutionally impermissible.
An examination of the dajazl and Rojadirecta cases is illustrative.
The first requirement is that the censor bear the burden of proving that the
materials being removed from circulation are constitutionally unprotected 86
706-07.
180Id at 699-700, 706-07.
181Government's Memorandum, supranote 176.
182Arara,478 U.S. at 705-06.
183Public Knowledge Amid Curiae Brief, supra note 20, at 10.
184See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
185 380 U.S. 51 (1956); see
supra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
186Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
179 Id.at
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Under the Operation's seizure scheme, the property owner has the obligation to
petition for the release of his property after it is seized, at which time he can
attempt to convince the court that First Amendment rights are implicated. This
procedure closely resembles the statutory scheme in Freedman that was found
unconstitutional for lake of this safeguard; after the censor board's refusal to
grant a license, the burden was on the individual attempting to show the film to
187
initiate court proceedings to establish that the film was protected expression.
In domain seizure cases, however, the government bears no burden of proving
that the materials are unprotected before seizing the domains; rather, it only has
to show that there is probable cause to believe the domains are forfeitable
property. 188 Under this standard, potential First Amendment concerns are not
addressed.
The second Freedman safeguard requires that an adversarialproceeding be
held to determine whether or not the expressive content at issue is
constitutionally protected. 189 This safeguard is also absent from the Operation's
procedures: the government is given authority to seize domains after ex parte
hearings' 90 and has the ability to delay bringing formal forfeiture proceedings
for a substantial amount of time thereafter.' 9' This effectively lends the type of
finality to the non-adversarial warrant hearings that the Freedman Court made
clear is unacceptable.
The last safeguard is the one most conspicuously lacking from the
Operation's seizure procedure: a prompt, final judicial decision. 192 The only
opportunity a claimant has for a final judicial determination under the
Operation's procedural scheme is through a formal forfeiture proceeding,
which the government has often been anything but prompt in initiating.193 In
the case of the dajazl seizure, the government blocked access to the website for
almost a year, only later to return it without ever initiating a forfeiture action.
Similarly, in the Rojadirecta case, the government did not initiate a forfeiture
proceeding until almost five months after formal the domain was seized.
Although forfeiture statutes require formal proceedings to be initiated by
specified deadlines, provisions allowing extension of these deadlines have
187 Id. at

59.

See, e.g.,Affidavit in Support of Application for Seizure Warrant Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2323(a)(1)(A)-(B), 981(b), United States v. The Following Domain Names, No. 11 MAG 262,
2011 WL 320195 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2011) (neglecting to mention any First Amendment concerns
that might be at issue in the seizures).
189 Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
190 See supra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
191See supra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
192 Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59.
193 See supra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
188
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proven susceptible to manipulation, ultimately rendering the deadlines
ineffective in assuring a prompt hearing. The government's inexplicable
delays194 lend credence to concerns that the Operation is being used to block
access to websites that might otherwise prevail in a trial on the merits.
Even outside the context of free speech and prior restraints, the balancing
test used by the Supreme Court in $8,850 in U.S. Curreny' 95 would likely lead to
a determination that the lengthy delays between seizures and hearings violate
due process.
C. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF DOMAIN SEIZURES

Although the Supreme Court has determined that due process does not
necessarily require property owners to be given notice and opportunity to be
heard prior to seizures in civil forfeiture actions, different considerations are
implicated when free speech is involved. In Fort Wayne Books, the Court held
that expressive content cannot be removed from circulation prior to an
adversarial hearing resulting in a determination that the content is not
constitutionally protected. 96 The purpose of the Operation's seizures is to
block access to online content-i.e., remove it from circulation-and seizures
are executed before any determination regarding the liability of the content is
made. The ex parte hearings conducted prior to the seizures simply do not
satisfy the procedural requirements of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has held that "mere probable cause to believe a legal
violation has transpired is not adequate to remove [expressive materials] from
circulation."' 97 The process used by ICE and the DOJ to seize domains is
therefore incompatible with the Constitution where free speech is involved.
Consequently, § 981, which allows property to be seized based on a showing of
probable cause that it is forfeitable, 198 cannot be relied upon to seize the
domains of websites hosting expressive content.
These issues should first be rectified through the judicial process. Courts
must ensure that the government complies with statutory deadlines and refrain
194 Most of the trial court documents were sealed during the time the dajazl domain was held
by the United States government, so any efforts to discover how or why they were able to skirt
the statutory requirements have proven to be fruitless. See Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Rep. Zoe Lofgren Q
&A with Attony GeneralHolder on Domain Seiyres, YouTUBE (June 7, 2012), http://www.youtu
be.coM/watch?feature=player._embedded&v=z5X9ir5YkTQ#!.
191See supra note 77 and accompanying text (outlining the four-part balancing test imposed by
the Court).
196 489 U.S. 46, 67 (1989).
197 Id at 66.

19818 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2) (2006).
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from granting extensions to those deadlines absent exigent circumstances. The
problems that arose out of the dajazl and Rojadirecta cases, namely
unnecessary delays, could have been easily avoided had the government been
held accountable by the judiciary.
Although judicial rigidity will ease some of the constitutional concerns, the
ultimate corrective action must lie with the legislature. There must be
legislation enacted to ensure that expressive content on the Internet is not
restricted in advance of an adversarial proceeding to determine whether such
content deserves First Amendment protection. Outdated forfeiture statutes can
no longer serve as the instrument to regulate Internet speech. They are blunt
instruments that lack the requisite sensitivity for application to the increasingly
complex modes of communication made possible on the Internet.
IV.

CONCLUSION

ICE and the DOJ launched Operation in Our Sites in 2010. The Operation
is aimed at stamping out widespread infringement of intellectual property rights
online, most notably that of trademark and copyrights. This objective is
pursued via the use of in rem forfeiture actions executed against the domain
names of websites believed to be facilitating online infringement. Domains are
seized in advance of formal forfeiture proceeding, effectively prohibiting online
users from accessing the targeted websites.
Although this method of seizing, and later seeking forfeiture of property
used in the commission of a crime is not new, its application to information
disseminated on the Internet is unprecedented. When applied in this context,
pretrial seizures function to restrain speech prior to it being made. American
jurisprudence has long held prior restraints of speech with the utmost
contempt, and the Supreme Court has identified no greater threat to free
expression. Prior restraints have been all but disallowed by the Court, and have
been deemed constitutionally acceptable only when accompanied by careful
procedural checks designed to minimize any impact on protected speech.
Copyright and forfeiture statutes relied on as authority to seize domains are
ill-suited for situations where free speech is implicated, and were designed to
function in the pre-Internet era. The result of their application to Internet
speech results in a system of virtually unchecked government censorship.
Courts and legislatures must ensure that the requisite safeguards and procedural
steps are in place before the Operation is allowed to continue.
Online infringement is an ever-growing problem, and it is one that is in dire
need of a solution. This pressing need, however, does not justify enforcement
programs that bluntly curtail the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. The

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2013

27

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 6

164

J. INTELL PROP. L

[Vol. 21:137

current functioning of Operation in Our Sites is repugnant to these freedoms,
and cannot be permitted to continue as is. If ICE and the DOJ wish to
continue using the Operation in the fight against online piracy, constitutional
concerns must be given much higher priority.
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